Often a corporation has an immediate cash need, either to avoid insolvency or for further opportunities it deems to be likely highly lucrative. In such a situation a corporation will often attempt to farm-out a percentage of a profitable field, or attempt a complete buy-out so that the corporation can meet its immediate cash needs. Here we show how one can quantitatively evaluate the farm-out price and fraction, or the buy-out price, most likely to lead to acceptance by a tendering corporation, and still maintain the highest chance of realizing the immediate cash needs. When parameters involved in the estimates of future field worth, future costs, and allied field-related parameters are themselves uncertain, we also provide a stochastic procedure that enables one to determine not only the greatest probability of a range of farm-out or buy-out prices being accepted, but which also enables one to determine which of the uncertain parameters is causing the greatest uncertainty. In this way one can see where to improve resolution should it be deemed necessary based on the total uncertainty and volatility of the estimated success chances. Numerical examples are given to illustrate all the various components of the deterministic farm-out considerations as well as the buy-out scenarios, and also for the uncertain parameter situations.
I. INTRODUCTION
In previous papers in this series (Lerche and Noeth, 2002a-e) , dominant concern was given to many aspects of acquiring further information in a producing field in order to determine what price one should pay for the information, and whether any such new information would really improve the chances of finding further hydrocarbons or of increasing the chances of higher production from already known accumulations within the field.
The concern in this paper is slightly different. Take it that a corporation has indeed performed all of the required steps to ensure the largest possible potential production from a field, so that after, such steps, the corporation is of the opinion that residual reserves in the dollar equivalent amount, R, are recoverable from the field. Take it also that the corporation has already produced reserves from the field and that, to date, the corporation has generated a total gain (in $) of G and has outlaid total costs so far of C. These costs include all acquisition costs for further information as well as direct production costs. And the gains to date may be greater or less that the costs to date. The remaining costs to produce the residual hydrocarbons are estimated at c.
The corporation is faced with three potential choices at this point to maximize total cash generated to the company. It can carry on producing the field, in which case the total estimated net value to the corporation is V1 = G -C+ R-c. It can attempt to buyout of the field at some price B, paid by another operator, in which case the total estimated net value to the corporation is V2 = G-C +B. It can attempt a partial farmout of the field to another corporation, at a cost F paid by the corporation farming-in, but can retain a fractional interest f in the field, so that from the residual production the corporation obtains fR and pays out residual costs of fc. In this case the total worth of the field to the corporation is V3 = G-C+F+fR-fc. At first glance the path the corporation should take to maximize total worth seems obvious: one takes that choice determined by the maximum value of V1, V2 or V3. Over the long haul, such a manoeuvre does indeed produce the highest worth (or the lowest loss). However, the three situations are not equivalent from a corporate perspective because the choice represented by V1 as the total worth, returns money slowly over the residual life of the field. The choice represented by V2 returns money immediately, while the choice represented by V3 returns some money immediately and some over the life of the field. The problem faced by the corporation is to determine its particular need for immediate return of capital versus its long term return requirements. This need can be particularly severe when, for instance, the gains to date, G, are less than the cost outlay, C, so that the corporation is willing to sell all or part of its potential long term gains in favour of more immediate cash in hand now. Without some immediate cash in hand there is a risk the corporation could end up bankrupt.
There is also the corporate position possible that the corporation sees other opportunities from which it estimates it can profit but requires cash on hand in order to invest in them. By selling some, or all, of the future field potential the corporation acquires the cash it needs.
In addition, the estimates the corporation has made at the present time of eventual recoverable residual reserves (as represented by the corporation's assessment R of future gains from the field) depends very much (in $ value) on the future selling price of oil over the life of the field -something the corporation does not know. Other companies may have a different outlook on potential oil prices and so be willing to offer more (or less) for a fraction of the working interest in the field. Thus there is a risk here, too, that the corporation has either underestimated, or overestimated, the future potential worth of residual recoverable reserves.
The aim of this paper is, then, to show how to take these various corporate problems into account in attempts to determine the best path for a corporation to follow, given that it has mandated immediate cash flow needs versus long-term capital accumulation potential.
II. DETERMINISTIC ESTIMATES OF NEED
Suppose that a corporation requires an immediate cash input of $M and determines to obtain this cash input from the producing field. Three options are available: either the corporation already has the cash on hand (which occurs if G-C>M) in which case the corporation stands pat; or the corporation has G<C and anticipates it can farm-out a fraction of its involvement in the field (in which case the requirement is a farm-in price to another company of F>C-G +M); or (again for G<C) the corporation sells its total involvement in the field (and requires a buy-out price of B>C-G +M to satisfy its corporate needs). However, even assuming the assessments of future reserves as made by the corporation are correct, the total residual net worth (RNW) of the field is only RNW = R-c. If RNW is less than B, then no other corporation will pay for a total buyout at the requested price. If RNW is less than F then no other corporation will accept a farm-in at the requested price. The corporation would then not be able to generate the desired immediate amount M from the field. Generally, the charge F to farm-in at some fraction of the RNW is less than the buy-out charge B, so that if RNW<F then RNW is automatically less than B. However, if RNW > F then RNW may still be less than B, but may also be greater. A general decision tree indicating the options available to the corporation is given in figure 1.
But the major concerns that arise in practise are related to the estimates the corporation has made. First, the anticipated RNW depends not only on the estimated ultimate recovery volume available but also on the future selling price of product/bbl. If the corporation has been optimistic in either the anticipated residual recoverable reserves and/or the selling price/bbl, then it presents an exaggerated value to any potential buyers or farm-in corporations. Second, the corporation usually is interested in a farm-out or buy-out when it needs immediate cash on hand. Such a situation commonly occurs when the corporation has not yet reached a break-even point (i.e. when G<C). And it is also the case that, while gains to date are relatively easily measured, the costs to date are often quite difficult to determine for they depend upon depending on whether a farm-out or a buy-out situation is envisioned corporate discount factor, write-downs of equipment and goodwill, and taxes unpaid to date. What is often the case is that the estimated costs are usually smaller than the actual costs, often by a factor of two or more. Thus two major unknowns pervade the picture of attempting to make a determination of what the corporation should do: the uncertainty on RNW and the uncertainty on the value of G-C.
There are two relatively simple ways to assess the effects of such uncertainty: one by assigning probabilities to the chances of achieving particular values for RNW and G-C; the other by allowing RNW and G-C to vary in some stochastic manner and so perform a Monte Carlo calculation of the chances. The two procedures are NOT the same for in the first case one keeps the values of RNW and G-C fixed and estimates the chances of the values being realized, while in the second case one asks for the probability distribution for each of the variables. As we shall demonstrate, each procedure has its strengths and weaknesses.
In this section of the paper, dealing with deterministic methods, we follow the first procedure.
a. Farm-out Considerations
Start first with the assumption that the corporate chiefs have mandated that a farm-out is to be considered at an amount F, retaining a fraction f of the future RNW =R-c. The mandate has arisen because the corporate decision-makers are not convinced that the gains to date will indeed meet the requirement G>C in the near future when bills for costs incurred to date come due. The corporation has a minimum farm-out price of F min =M -(G-C), which has to be positive (i.e. M>G-C) in order to achieve its goal of having instant cash on hand of M. It also has a maximum farm-out price possible of F max = (1-f)(R-c), which is the residual worth of the field to other corporations, who will certainly not pay more than F max based on the disclosures of future field worth from the offering corporation. Note that F max exceeds F min only when M<(1-f)(R-c)+G-C= M max . Alternatively, if the required cash on hand amount M is fixed, then the fraction of the RNW the corporation can retain for itself at farm-out is limited to f< (R-c+G-C-M)/(R-c) = f max , and f max is less than unity whenever M>G--C, which is required anyway. Now there is no guarantee that a particular farm-out price F, lying between the two limits above, will be accepted by another corporation. Indeed, a corporation considering the farm-out offer is interested in obtaining the highest fractional interest it can obtain in the field at the lowest price, i.e. it wants F as low as possible and (1-f) as high as possible. The offering corporation, on the other hand, wants F as high as possible (and certainly greater than F min ) and (1-f) as low as possible. Thus for a given value F, there is only a probability, p (F), that the farm-out offer will be accepted at the fraction (1-f )RNW made available by the offering corporation. The probability, p (F), is high (unity) when F is small (zero) and is low (zero) when F is high (F max ). A simple model for such a behaviour is a linear model in the form
For illustrative purposes, we shall use the linear model throughout the remainder of the paper but interested readers are encouraged to investigate the technical changes brought about by other choices. With this background information and allowed ranges of behaviour, the corresponding decision-tree diagram for the farm-out situation is given in Figure 2 .
While it is not clear whether G will exceed C, or whether G will exceed C+M once G does exceed C, which accounts for the three possible paths shown on Figure 2 , one can model the probability that G>C as p(G>C)= [1+sign(G-C)]/2 and p(G>C+M) = [1+sign(G-C-M)]/2. These simple representations become of great value in the section of the paper dealing with uncertain parameter values, as we shall demonstrate. But whether G>C or G<C, the point is that the three paths depicted in figure 2 represent the options under a farm-out decision. Using the decision-tree of figure 2, a quantitative Excel program can then be easily constructed to account of any and all possible variations of parameters, with the restrictions on F and f outlined above. Appendix A illustrates such a program.
The numerical values used to illustrate the farm-out situation are: gains to date, G= $60MM; costs to date, C=$84MM; anticipated future gains of R=$245MM, future costs, c= $60MM, with an immediate need of cash on hand, M=$20MM. In this situation the minimum and maximum farm-out prices the corporation can achieve depend on the fraction, f, of the field the corporation would like to retain. For the three cases of f = 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75, the minimum farm-out price needed by the corporation is F min = $44MM in all cases, while the maximum it can ask for is F max = $138.75, 92.5, 46.25 respectively. The maximum fraction of the field the corporation can retain, and still achieve its goal of $20MM cash on hand, is limited to 76.2%. However, because there is no guarantee that an offered farm-out price will automatically be
Value =V6=F+fR-fc-(C-G);Cash on hand = F-(C-G) which exceeds M when F>M+(C-G) Figure 2 . Decision-tree diagram appropriate for the farm-out situation discussed in text Figure 3 . Probability a farm-out price is accepted versus the farm-out price offered depending on the fraction retained by the offering corporation for the parameters given in the body of the text Figure 4 . Probability that the cash on hand for a farm-out offer will exceed the cash needed as a function of the farm-out price offered for different retention fractions and using the parameter values in text accepted, there is equally not a 100% guarantee the corporation will achieve its goal. Indeed, figure 3 shows the probability that a farm-out offer will be accepted in each of the three cases using the linear "resistance " model for the probability an offer will be accepted, while figure 4 shows the probability that the corporation will end up with cash on hand exceeding its needed immediate cash for different farm-out offers it makes in each of the three cases. There is clearly a need to offer high enough to achieve the highest probability of reaching the immediate need but at the same time not set the offer so high that there is but a slim chance the offer will be accepted. For instance, in the case of retention of 25% of the field, the best the corporation can hope for is a farm-out price of about $80MM but it has only about a 58% chance of yielding the cash requirements of the corporation and only about a 40% chance of being accepted anyway. Either the corporation lowers its retention fraction or its farm-out price -or both of course. Faced with such an unpalatable dilemma, the corporation may decide to just plain sell its total interest in the field. This buy-out situation is considered next.
b. Buy-out Considerations
Precisely the same parameters are considered here as for the farm-out situation. The main difference is that the corporation retains zero interest in the field after offering the field for sale at a buy-out price as depicted in figure 5 . However, just as in the case of the farm-out situation, there is a maximum buy-out price the corporation can ask for and a minimum it needs for its immediate requirements. That minimum needed is again the $44MM of the previous farm-out illustration, while the maximum is B max = $185MM. However, once more there will be resistance to purchase the offered buyout at the highest price. As for the farm-out situation, this resistance is modelled here . Probability that a given buy-out price offered will be accepted as a function of the offered buy-out price Figure 7 . Probability that the cash on hand for a buy-out offer will exceed the cash needed as a function of the buy-out price offered using the parameter values in text as a linear probability of purchase in the form p(B) = 1-B/B max . Figures 6 and 7 show, respectively, the probability of a buy-out offer being accepted as the buy-out offering price is raised, together with the corresponding probability that the corporation will end up with enough cash on hand to satisfy its immediate corporate needs. Again note that the chance of ending up with enough cash on hand has a maximum of about 38% at a buy-out offer price of some $120MM, but the probability that such a buy-out offer will be accepted is only about 35%. So either the corporation accepts the risk of not achieving its immediate needs from either the farm-out or the buy-out situations, or it determines to retain the field and look elsewhere for its needed cash -such as by obtaining a loan against future field production, or by firing employees to meet its immediate needs, or by alternative investment strategies that do not involve farm-out or buy-out of the field.
As the gains to date increase relative to costs to date, there comes a point where the corporation has enough cash on hand to avoid either of the less than palatable scenarios just depicted. The price paid here is one of time. If the corporation cannot wait until a rosier picture prevails but must have its cash now, then it has little choice but to borrow money, fire employees and/or farm-out or buy-out. Most modern corporations do all of these. A development of the combined considerations would take the scope of this paper to far afield and such investigations are best left to those more capable than ourselves.
III. STOCHASTIC ESTIMATES OF NEED
While a corporation often has an extremely clear idea of how much cash on hand it needs for its immediate purposes, it often has a much less clear idea of how much gains and costs a field will occur in the future; it also often does not have a sharp picture of gains and costs to date. There is, then, a major uncertainty within a corporation as to what it should ask for a farm-out or buy-out price and, in the case of a farm-out situation, what fraction of the fuzzy future assessed gains from the field it should retain.
In attempts to limit this uncertainty, a corporation often sets up "What If" scenarios. These situations consider the likely outcomes for its immediate needs if it were to offer not a fixed buy-out or farm-out price, but rather a range of price offers within which the corporation believes it can provide a greater likelihood of negotiating a successful outcome so that it will have the immediate cash on hand it requires.
To illustrate simply how such uncertainties can be addressed, and also to illustrate how to determine which of the many parameters needs to be better determined to minimize best the volatility of the buy-out or farm-out situations, we consider here two cases. The first deals with uncertainty under farm-out conditions, and the second with the corresponding uncertainty under buy-out conditions.
a. Uncertainty under Farm-out Conditions
In order to draw as close a parallel as possible with the deterministic illustrations given in the previous section, here we retain the same nominal values for gains and costs as shown in Appendix A, both for the present-day and also for the future estimates. We also retain the sharp immediate need requirement of $20MM. However, each of the values for gains and costs is taken to vary by ± 20% around the corresponding nominal values. Thus we allow: $48MM<G<$72MM, with a nominal value of G = $60MM; $67.2MM<C<$100.8MM with a nominal value of C = $84MM; $196MM<R<$294MM with a nominal value of R = $245MM; and $48MM<c<$72MM, with a nominal value of c = $60MM.
For the farm-out conditions, take it that a nominal fractional value of f = 0.25 is to be retained by the corporation, but the corporation allows this value to range between f = 0.15 to f = 0.35. The farm-out price the corporation offers is equally fuzzy, in the sense that it advertises:
"All tenders lying between $64MM and $96MM will be considered, with associated farm-in fractions lying between 0.85 and 0.65".
In this way the corporation covers the most likely deterministic scenarios of the previous illustrations but allows also negotiation room in respect of the fraction it wishes to retain and farm-in prices tendered. Note that a preference for tenders in the neighbourhood of $80MM (the nominal value of the previous deterministic illustration maximizing the probability the corporation will have cash on hand exceeding its immediate needs) is now something not available to tendering corporations. Clearly, a tender at the highest price and the lowest farm-in fraction is what the corporation is aiming for.
The question is: To what extent has the uncertainty in either the basic parameters G, C, R and c, or in the fraction, f, to be retained, or the farm-out price range, F, influenced the chances the corporation will succeed in obtaining the needed immediate cash, and which of the uncertain parameters is causing the greatest uncertainty on the estimated success chances?
The easiest way to address this question is by using a Monte Carlo type of approach in which each uncertain parameter is allowed to be selected at random from a declared underlying distribution for that parameter, and a count kept of the total of all results, so that both the success chance and the uncertainty aspects can be addressed at the same time. The only remaining question is: what underlying distributions does one choose for each parameter and to what extent do the choices of distribution dominate (or not) the distributions of output possibilities? We investigate here the two choices of uniform and triangular distributions to see the various contributions and their influences on uncertainty in relation to the uncertainty caused by the ranges of each parameter.
Two figures are presented for each choice of underlying distribution: the cumulative probability distribution that the cash on hand will exceed the cash required, and the relative contributions of each of the variables to the variance on the cumulative probability distribution. In this way one obtains not only the magnitude of the uncertainty on the probability due to uncertainty on the parameter values, but also information on which parameters are causing the greatest uncertainty. The magnitude of the uncertainty in relation to the mean value (the so-called volatility) informs on when the cumulative probability is relatively precise, while the relative contribution diagram informs on which parameters one needs to improve first (in the sense of narrowing their ranges of uncertainty) in order to lower the volatility -assuming one has determined the volatility is high enough to warrant improvement. A volatility measure much in excess of unity implies but little confidence in the mean value, while a volatility much less than unity implies a sharply determined value for the chance of obtaining cash on hand in excess of that required.
Thus for instance, in the case of uniform underlying distributions for all parameters, figure 8 indicates that there is 25% chance or less that the probability one will obtain cash on hand exceeding that required ($20MM) is less than about 42% =P(25), there is 50% chance or less that the probability one will obtain the required cash is less than about 51% =P(50), and 75% chance that the probability one will obtain the needed cash is less than about 63% = P(75). If one defines a volatility v = (P(75)--P(25))/P(50), as a measure of the uncertainty, then v = 0.4. In this case the volatility is not really very small compared to unity, so that there is a significant degree of uncertainty attached to the probability of obtaining the required immediate cash. Figure 9 , indicates that the greatest relative contributions to this uncertainty are being caused by the uncertainty in the estimates of future reserves (at just over 43%) with the uncertainty in costs to date providing a relatively close second at about 33%. If one wishes to improve the uncertainty on the probability of obtaining enough cash for immediate needs, then one should concentrate on narrowing the ranges of these two variables ahead of any others, because together they make up about 76% of the total uncertainty. Figure 8 . Cumulative probability that the cash on hand expected from a farm-out will exceed the cash needed as a function of the chance that one will receive the needed cash. This calculation is for a uniform distribution choice for all the parameters involved, as indicated in text
Precisely the same logic path can be followed for the case where all underlying distributions are chosen to be triangular rather than uniform. Figures 10 and 11 , respectively, correspond to figures 8 and 9, respectively. In this triangular case note that P(25) = 48%, P(50) = 55% and P(75) = 65%, for a volatility of some 0.31. As is to be expected the volatility is smaller in this triangular situation than the uniform distribution case because there is a greater chance the Monte Carlo procedure will choose parameter values closer to the central nominal values just by definition of the difference between a uniform and a triangular distribution. Note also that the P(50) value in the uniform case is around 51% while for the triangular situation it is around 55%. While not as large an uncertainty effect as that produced by the ranges of each of the parameters, it does represent nearly an 8% dynamic range swing on the P(50) value, corresponding to an uncertainty in the mean value of 53 ±2%.
Equally in the triangular situation, as shown in Figure 11 , it is again the uncertainty in the future reserves estimate and also in the costs to date that dominate the uncertainty. The relative contributions to the uncertainty are somewhat different in this case compared to the uniform situation at just over 50% and 23% for future reserves and costs to date (cf. 43% and 33%), reflecting the non-linear dependence of the cumulative probability for cash on hand exceeding cash required on the variables and also, of course, the influence of the triangular versus uniform distributions. But together the two variables account for about 73% of the variance, again indicating that, despite the different values, it is the same two parameters that need to be controlled better. In both situations, the general observation is that there is only about a 53% chance one will obtain enough cash on hand to exceed the cash needed -assuming that someone accepts the farm-out. 
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b. Uncertainty under Buy-Out Conditions
The behaviour under buy-out conditions follows basically the same pattern as for the farm-out situations just described. Here we show the influence of a ±20% uncertainty on the nominal buy-out price of $120MM (chosen because it represents the highest chance of having cash on hand exceeding cash needed for the deterministic illustration given previously), together with uncertainties on gains to date, costs to date, future gains, future costs all as set for the farm-out illustrations above, and again with an immediate need for cash of $20MM. Once more both uniform and triangular distributions for the uncertain parameters are used, and Monte Carlo calculations done for both situations.
Results for the cumulative probability of obtaining cash on hand in excess of that needed, and also for the relative contributions to the variance are given in figures 12 and 13 for the case of a uniform distribution choice, and in figures 14 and 15 for the case of triangular distributions.
For the uniform distribution case, one sees from figure 12 that P(25) = 15%, P(50) = 32%, while P(75) = 50%, representing a volatility of v = 1.1, suggesting that there is significant uncertainty on the mean value. Indeed, the chance of only 32% of achieving the needed cash on hand is not too discordant with the deterministic peak value chance of some 38%, which supports the interpretation. The largest contributors to the uncertainty in this uniform case are the costs to date and the future gains estimates at about 44% and 22% respectively, although uncertainty in future costs also is not a small contributor at nearly 19%, as shown in figure 13 .The implication here is Figure 12 . For the buy-out situation discussed in text, the cumulative probability that the cash on hand from a buy-out will exceed the needed cash as a function of the chance one will receive the needed cash, with uniform distribution choices for the underlying uncertain parameters as discussed in text Figure 13 . Relative contribution sensitivity diagram indicting which parameters contribute most to the uncertainty of figure 12, for the uniform distribution choice of the parameters in the buy-out situation Figure 14 . As for Figure 12 but for triangular distributions of the underlying parameters that the costs to date uncertainty is more than twice as important to resolve than any other variable uncertainty if one is to lower the absolute uncertainty on the chances of obtaining cash on hand in excess of cash needed. For the comparison case of triangular choices for the underlying uncertain parameters, figure 14 indicates that P(25) = 29%, P(50) = 37%, and P(75) = 48%, yielding a volatility of v = 0.5, somewhat smaller than the uniform distribution case, as to be expected, and with a 50% value close to that for the deterministic example. The corresponding relative uncertainty contributions are given in figure 15 , where one can see that costs to date (at about 49%), followed by future gains (at about 26%), and gains to date (at about 23%) dominate the uncertainty in the cumulative probability of obtaining cash on hand in excess of that needed.
Again then we have the same three variables as in the uniform distribution case dominating the uncertainty. While the assessments of each relative contribution are not quite the same as in the uniform case, it is still clear which variables to attempt to define better in order to improve the uncertainty on the chances of having cash on hand exceeding needed cash.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The purpose of this work has been to indicate that while a corporation will often have as a long-term desire the maximization of profit from an oilfield, this desire must often be tempered by the need of the corporation for more immediate cash that it must have urgently. Under such conditions one avenue of financial return a corporation seeks is to farm-out or buy-out the future production from the field. A corporation may also follow other routes to achieving its required cash, such as borrowing against future 376 Value Change in Oil and Gas Production: VI. Buy-Out, Farm-Out, or Stand Figure 15. As for Figure 13 but for triangular distributions of the underlying parameters field production, or firing employees. However, only the farm-out and buy-out situations have been investigated here because an investigation involving more complex considerations is well outside the bailiwick of this current investigation. What we have shown is that there very quantitative methods available for deciding whether a farm-out or a buy-out make the most financial sense to a corporation, and also how the corporation should go about deciding which to undertake, and the fraction of the future field production it should retain unto itself. We have also shown that the "resistance" factors to accepting an offered farm-out or buy-out can be handled by including a probability that the offer will be accepted. While such was done only for linear aversion factors there is no great difficulty in including more complex resistance considerations.
In addition, when parameters are uncertain, we have shown that it is still possible to set ranges for each and to determine which parameter ranges need to be more sharply defined in order to constrain better the uncertainty on the chances of obtaining enough cash to satisfy the immediate corporate needs.
Perhaps the main point of the illustrations is to show that one can set relevant parameter ranges and determine relevant buy-out or farm-out conditions that will provide the greatest chance the corporation will achieve its urgently needed capital, while preserving its long-range goal of maximizing total returns to the corporation. The corporation must accept some risk that the buy-out or farm-out offers will not be accepted. This paper has shown how to accommodate for such factors and retain the highest probability if obtaining the required cash. 
